Bryan Caplan has read the research literature on paying women who have babies:
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There are actually two distinct literatures. The first focuses on the effect of intentional “birth subsidies” on child-bearing. The second focuses on the unintentional effect of welfare (and welfare reform) on child-bearing.
It turns out that payments to women to have more babies are more successful in producing babies if payments are made to married women who already have at least one baby.
His post concludes:
…both findings suggest that, as a rule, young unmarried women get pregnant by mistake. They’re far from affirmatively wanting a baby, so modest financial incentives don’t change their plans. Older, married women, in contrast, are already “in the baby business.” They’re close enough to wanting another child that a little financial encouragement is often all it takes to tip them over the edge.
Perhaps the answer lies in the differing social situations. Married women have more than a (possibly fickle, short-term) financial supporting structure.
Marriage is larger than a social contract between two consenting adults. Babies are not short-term, and they are more than financial investments.
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Tags: children, Home, Pregnancy, Research, Welfare, Welfare reform, Women
